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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT*
The first fourteen of the Federalist Papers contain an elaborate argument
for the adoption of the Constitution based on the necessity for maintaining
order in the state. Says Madison, "A landed interest, a manufacturing interest,
a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up
of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation ......,,He goes
on to warn against allowing any one faction to become a judge in its own cause
through its ability to influence the agencies of government.
Subsequent experience has shown that the conflicts between employers and
labor represent one of the more serious forms of factional disturbance in the
state. In these conflicts labor has been seriously handicapped by restrictions
imposed by law and by employers upon its right to organize. Like some previ* For a discussion of the activities of the National Labor Relations Board, see Despres and
Myer, The National Labor Relations Board-Decisions of its First Year, ante p. 97.
'Madison, The Federalist, No. x, p. 43 (Everyman ed. 1934).
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ous pieces of legislation covering labor organization problems, the National
Labor Relations Act has been hailed by labor organizers in some quarters as a
solvent of their political and legal difficulties.3 The constitutionality of the act,
however, has been subjected to attack on a number of grounds. A consideration
of these seems to show that the Supreme Court can, with almost equal facility:
(i) hold the act unconstitutional in toto on the ground that it combines inseparably both constitutional and unconstitutional types of regulation; (2) hold
it constitutional under the commerce clause, but limit the scope of its application to the immediate instrumentalities of interstate transportation and communication; or (3) hold it constitutional and applicable also to the labor relations of all producers whose product is important in interstate commerce. The
purpose of this note is to examine the three choices apparently open to the
Supreme Court.
I. In determining whether the act is unconstitutional in toto, it seems that
since the act is limited in terms to apply only to questions affecting commerce,
the court should not invalidate the whole act unless it finds (i) that the kind of
regulation imposed by the act is in itself unconstitutional, or (2) that if the
regulation is imposed upon parties to whom the act does not legitimately apply,
the damage attendant upon being declared guilty of an unfair labor practice,
which is prerequisite to judicial review, is so great that parties will submit to
regulation rather than seek judicial protection.4 In Bendix Products Corp. v.
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166 (1935). The purpose of the National Labor

Relations Act is to eliminate by the promotion of collective bargaining some of the chief causes
of labor disputes in large enterprises where labor troubles affect the public generally as well as
the disputants. To accomplish this the act provides (i) in § 9 machinery for selection of representatives of employees to bargain with the employer, and (2) in § io machinery for prevention
of practices tending to obstruct or nullify the benefits of collective action. It is the duty of the
Board created by the act, when a dispute "affecting commerce" is found to exist concerning
representation for purposes of bargaining, to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, and
to investigate and certify to the interested parties the names of the persons selected by a
majority of the employees in that unit to represent them. Thereafter these persons are the
exclusive representatives of the unit for purposes of collective bargaining in regard to matters
covered by the act (§ 9). It is also the duty of the Board to hear complaints of unfair practices
-interference, domination, discrimination, refusal to bargain-and to issue "cease and desist"
orders enforceable in proper cases by the circuit court of appeals (§ io).
3 For a discussion of the present act and its antecedents, and the relation of these to the
political attitude of American labor, see Mason, Federal Control of the Employer-Employee
Relation, 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 277 (1936).
4 In Ex park Young, 209 U.S. 123 (i908), it was held that an act fixing railway fares and
providing penalties of up to $5ooo and five years imprisonment for each violation in effect
denied equal protection of the laws. The Court concluded that even though a party has no
constitutional right to break a law in order to test its constitutionality, if an attempted regulation provides such severe penalties for non-compliance that parties in doubt will submit rather
than risk an adverse finding in the courts the act deprives such parties of essential constitutional protection. This somewhat anomalous doctrine has been distinguished from the usual
doctrine applied to criminal statutes, in that it is said to apply to types of regulation not clearly
and absolutely within the legislative power. However, the scope of the doctrine is extremely
ill-defined.
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Bernan,s a representative case which will be used as a basis for discussion, the
court found an unconstitutional type of regulation-"compulsory unilateral
arbitration ' 6 and "majority rule"--which is also so imposed that all parties
who seek judicial review are damaged as the price of review, regardless of
whether or not the act is applicable to them. The regulation and the difficulties
attendant upon judicial review were held to constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
The argument by which the district court established that the act provides
for "compulsory unilateral arbitration," is worth noting. It is as follows: Suppose one of the rival unions is selected as the exclusive representative of the
employees. It is an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively concerning terms of employment;7 and the act expressly permits an employer to make a closed shop agreement, 8 which may be termed a "condition of
employment." Suppose the representatives propose such an agreement. The
employer must bargain, but-says the district court-he must obviously bargain either with or without a good faith intention of actually entering into a
closed shop agreement. But it is clear that one of these alternatives is prohibited to the employer by the act. For a person could not be said to "bargain"
for the purchase of a house if he had a fixed determination not to buy under
any circumstances; i.e. if he bargains without a good faith intention to reach
an agreement he does not bargain at all. Therefore an employer, once approached on the subject, must enter into a closed shop agreement of some sortthat is, he is subjected to "compulsory unilateral arbitration." However, the
"alternatives" relied upon in this argument are of course not exhaustive since a
person need not have an actual intention either to do or not to do a given act.
He may be in a state of suspended judgment in which he entertains the possibility of intending either one without actually intending the one or the other.
In fact, in common understanding, people are said to "bargain" only so long
as they are open to different decisions; and indeed the term "bargain" excludes
the notion of a single, fixed determination.9 Consequently this objection, which
514 F.Supp.

58 (Ill. 1936).
6This phrase was apparently coined by Dean William H. Spencer. It appears in Spencer,

The National Labor Relations Act (X935). For an analysis of Dean Spencer's exposition of
this objection, see infra, p. 112. Cf. the argument of Barnes, J. in the Bendix case, stated
infra, p. 114.
8

(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935); 29 U.S.C.A. § i58 (5) (1935)8Sec. 8(3): ......
nothing in this Act ....shall preclude an employer from making an
7 Sec.

agreement with a labor organization ....to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section
9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made."
9 Bargaining has been defined as: (i) The act of discussing the terms of a proposed agreement. i Century Dictionary 451 (1911). (2) To treat with anyone as to the terms which one
party is to give, and the other to accept, in a transaction between them; to try to secure the
best possible terms; to haggle over terms. i Oxford Dictionary 670 (1888).
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is based on a classical error in logic, fails to bring the act under the established
rule against "compulsory arbitration" laws.o
There is a variant of the "compulsory arbitration" argument."r Under the
interpretation of the "duty to bargain" which was made under §7(a) of the
2
National Industrial Recovery Act by the old National Labor Relations Board3

an employer must not merely listen, but must meet proposals with reasonable
objections or counter-proposals. If there exist no available reasonable objections, it is clear that the employer must either make a concession of some sort
or be adjudged by the Board guilty of a refusal to bargain. A circuit court of
appeals could then order him to bargain. This would necessitate some concession. In the absence of reasonable objections to a proposal, then, the employer
would inevitably be forced into some sort of agreement with the labor representatives; that is, he would, by judicial process, be forced into a contract on
terms not actually acceptable to him merely because he had no reasonable
objections to terms of the contract as proposed and did not want to make
otherproposals. This argument leads to the conclusion that the employer would
under this act be deprived of the right to an unreasonable refusal to contract,
which is nevertheless a property right. We can see that, assuming that the
interpretation of "bargaining" given above is adopted by the courts, there is
the possibility that an employer could be forced by judicial process to be reasonable, in violation of his hitherto unquestioned right or privilege to be unreasonable. It should be noted, however, that this objection may be almost wholly
academic; since few executives in the past have been unable to show or create
good "business reasons" for doing or not doing a given thing. There is, then a
real difference, and in practice there would probably be a vast difference between this and a "compulsory arbitration" act, such as that considered in the
Wolff case; 4 for under that act, the Industrial Court's determination would
merely have to be fair to both sides and not clearly unreasonable, while here the
ultimate agreement would have to be fair to the employer beyond reasonable
doubt.' s But still the argument cannot lightly be dismissed. There is not, strict10Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). The statute in
question set up a court of arbitration, which in case of dispute could step in and make an
arbitration agreement binding upon the parties. There is, of course, a clear distinction between
compelling a party to arbitrate a difficulty and compelling him to entertain, and perhaps even
meet with reasonable counter-proposals, the proposals of another party looking toward a
possible arbitration agreement. "To bargain" does not mean "to reach an agreement." For a
discussion of compulsory arbitration laws, see Simpson, Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 753 (1925).
"1The discussion that follows is based largely upon Spencer, The National Labor Relations

Act

21-29 (1935).
Stat. I98 (1933);

248

15 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (supp. 1934).

13

Matter of Houde Engineering Corp., N.L.R.B. Decisions, (July-Dec., 1935) at 35.

'4

See note io supra.

IsSome commentators ignore the fact that a proposal may be reasonable, and that at the
same time there may be reasonable objections to it. This arises from the fact that in practical
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ly, compulsory arbitration; but there may be some interference with "freedom
of contract" in the provisions of the present act. The effect of finding such
interference can be discussed in connection with the next major objection"majority rule."
6
The "majority rule" is set up in the provisions for selecting representatives.,
The proviso in section 9(a), that individuals shall have the right to present
grievances, when read in connection with the provisions that the selected representatives are exclusive representatives of the unit for collective bargaining as
well as the provisions that discriminatory contracts of employment may not
be made,17 may be construed to imply that individuals and minority groups
retain only the right to present grievances and that no individual or minority
group can make a separate agreement of any kind with the employer.,' If this
inference is correct, 9 there is undoubtedly a restraint upon an absolute "freedom of contract." It is well settled, however, that freedom of contract" is a
matters equally reasonable men may properly reach different conclusions, each supported by
rational argument. Thus a court of arbitration might reach a fair solution of a dispute, even
though both disputants could still present reasonable arguments against it; while under the
present "duty to bargain," an employer could not be forced into an agreement so long as a
single reasonable objection remained open to him, even assuming the above definition of bargaining.
x Sec. 9(a), "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer."
'7 Sec. 8(3), "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .......
18The exception in favor of presentation of grievances alone may be held to imply that
the individual retains no other rights; since the exceptions from a power mark its bounds.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1824).
'9 The correctness of this inference is not indisputable. The act nowhere states expressly
that an employer and an employee cannot make separate agreements, provided the nature of
the agreement is not such as to tend to encourage or discourage the employee in the matter of
his choice of representatives. This proviso, it is true, limits individual agreements very materially; but neither the act nor common sense seems to require that minor individual adjustments, sometimes made to accommodate either employer or employee in the course of business,
be prohibited. The act in terms merely provides that if an employee is to be represented,and
the terms of his employment fixed for him by third parties, the representatives must be selected
by certain rules. This might well be interpreted as aimed primarily at the rubber-stamp company-union representative. Unless it is urged that all arrangements between employer and
employee necessarily tend to coerce the employee in his selection of representatives, it would
seem that the only area within which arrangements are actually made in practice is not
affected by the terms of the act.
20The denial of a right to contract in this instance does not seem to differ materially from
the denial of a right not to contract which would be involved in the preceding instance.
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qualified, not an absolute right; that freedom implies absence of arbitrary restraint, but not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.2x The prevention of discriminatory

contracts with individuals and minority groups seems clearly and reasonably
necessary to insure to employees a right to bargain collectively; and it is by
no means clear that the act is intended to do more than prevent discrimination.22
Thus, assuming that with respect to parties in commerce the Supreme Court
finds a sufficient relation between collective bargaining and the public interest
in unhampered commerce, 3 the objection to majority rule is not insurmountable.
In addition to the foregoing, a principal objection advanced in the Bendix
case was that the act imposes damage as the price of review of the Board's
determinations.24 The damage consists of profits lost by reason of the Board's
proceedings: either (i) the expense and inconvenience of supplying witnesses
and records at hearings, or the demoralization and loss of employees' good-will
attending an election campaign in the plant; or (2) the loss of public good-will
and trade from the pendency of proceedings charging unfair labor practices, or
from fihe issuance of a "cease and desist" order by the Board. This damage is
made possible by the fact that the act provides for review only after a hearing
on a complaint of unfair labor practice resulting in the issuance of or refusal to
issue a "cease and desist" order, whereupon the party aggrieved may apply to
the circuit court of appeals for review.25 Only then do the questions of the
Board's jurisdiction, 6 its determination of the proper bargaining unit,27 and its
21Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (19ii).
- If the act is intended to ban all individual and minority agreements, whether discriminatory or not, it may be open to objections such as those advanced in the Adair and Coppage
cases, note 39 infra. It may be that most individual agreements tend to be discriminatory,
and that as a practical matter a blanket prohibition of all contracts but those with the majority would have the same effect as a prohibition of discriminatory contracts alone. However,
the technical difference is quite definite and should be adhered to.
3 Since Congress has found that one of the chief causes of labor troubles is the interference
by employers with the organization of labor for purposes of collective bargaining, the Court
may apply the usual presumption that the legislature has acted advisedly and with full knowledge of the situation. See Ches. & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Manning, i86 U.S. 238 (1902).
F.Supp. 5S, 67-68 (Ill. 1936).
Sec. 10, 49 Stat. 455 (1935); 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (i935).

24 14
25

26 In

Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 83 F. (ad) 998 (C.C.A.
15, 1936), the court refused to enforce a "cease and desist" order of the Board on the
ground that the Board lacked jurisdiction of a dispute in a manufacturing plant.
5 th June

27 In El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, i5 F.Supp. 8i, 89 (Tex. June io, i936) the court incidentally brought into question the propriety of the Board's designation of five smaller departments as an appropriate bargaining unit, although the point was not expressly decided there.
While the act does not expressly provide for review of the propriety of a designation of the
bargaining unit, this provision is probably to be implied from the general power of the reviewing court to examine the entire record and enforce or modify the Board's order at its discretion,
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certification of representatives come before a court. However, to balance the
charge that the holding of an election or a hearing will cause an appreciable
deprivation of property, there is the fact that the Board, before assuming jurisdiction, must find as a matter of fact that labor trouble and disruption of business is sufficiently probable to warrant interference.28 If the Board is about to
prevent strife by its action, no loss of profits can reasonably be attributed to its
action; but if it is about to cause strife which would otherwise not exist, there
is certainly a deprivation of property.
In appraising the force of the objection to the "majority rule" provision and
to the provisions for judicial review, analogies to existing acts may be helpful.
Upon both these points there is a very close analogy between the Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act 29 and the Federal Trade Commission
Act30 respectively. The Railway Labor Act3" makes provision for collective bargaining and self-organization, by which the majority of any class or craft has
the right to determine who shall represent the whole group for the purposes of
the act, and provides that the Mediation Board, upon request of either party,
is to certify the names of the chosen representatives, resorting if necessary to
an election. While there is no express prohibition of individual bargaining, the
Railway Labor Act prevents interference, domination or discrimination ;32 and
it has been indicated that under proper circumstances the representatives
elected by the majority have recourse to mandatory injunction to compel the
carrier to bargain collectively with them.33 It is noteworthy that the right of
the Mediation Board to conduct an election has not been successfully challenged, as yet, even upon the ground of loss of profits and deprivation of property without due process. Yet it would be difficult to show that the loss of
profits and employees' good-will resulting to a carrier from an election under
§ xo(e), (f). It should be noted, however, that Barnes, J., in the Bendix case, at 66, concluded
that neither the Board's assumption of jurisdiction nor its designation of an appropriate bargaining unit is subject to review under the act.
28 Sec. 2(7) defines "affecting commerce" as" ....
having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening .... commerce." § 9(c) and § io(a) require the Board to find that a "question affecting commerce" has arisen. For the presumption aiding a board in such matters, see
note 37 ihfra.
2948 Stat. 1186 (i934); 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-158 ('935).
3038 Stat. 717 (1914); I U.S.C.A. §§ 41-51 (1927).
31 Sec. 2, 48 Stat. ix86 (i934); 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (1935).
32We may interpret the act, without straining the construction, to disapprove of discriminatory individual contracts insofar as they would directly tend to nullify the rights of selforganization and collective action. That is, if the carrier could make special contracts with all
individuals who would promise not to do or to do certain things, the intended freedom of choice
might easily become "a mockery."
'3 In Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 84 F.(2d) 641 (C.C.A. 4 th June 18,
1936), a mandatory injunction requiring the carrier to treat with the representative elected
by the majority was held proper. Cerl. granted, C.C.H. Labor Law Serv. x6ooo (1936).
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the Railway Labor Act is significantly less than the corresponding loss to an
employer under the Labor Relations Act.
With respect to judicial review, the Federal Trade Commission Act34 provides that the Commission, upon finding as a fact that it will be to the public
interest to investigate trade practices of a party found by the Commission to
be engaging in interstate trade, may give notice of hearing, subpoena records
and witnesses, and if it thinks proper enter a "cease and desist" order.3S Upon
the issuance of such an order, the party aggrieved may obtain review by the
circuit court of appeals of the jurisdiction of the Commission and of its findings;
but until an order issues, the party has no recourse to the courts.36 It has been
repeatedly held that even though there is no review until after a final order, with
its attendant odium, the judicial review provided is adequate, there being a
presumption that administrative tribunals will not act unreasonably nor impose
expense unnecessarily.37 It seems questionable, therefore, whether the odium
and loss of profits attaching to proceedings under the National Labor Relations
Act is so much greater than the expense and inconvenience and odium attending
proceedings before the Trade Commission that the presumption of reasonableness normally attending such proceedings should be abandoned38 and the act
held fatally lacking in constitutional protection to parties brought by the Board
within its jurisdiction.
In addition to the objections urged in the Bendix case, it is possible that a
vulnerable portion of the act is the prohibition in section 8(3) of discrimination
Stat. 717 (1914); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-5 (1927).
35Secs. 5-6, 38 Stat. 719-21 (1914); i U.S.C.A. §§ 45-46 (1927).
36Sec. 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914); 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (I927). It has been said that while it might
34 38

be desirable from some viewpoints that the law should provide for a preliminary review of
questions of jurisdiction, the courts should not assume that power without such a provision;
that to halt an investigation prematurely would be an invasion of the legislative and executive
branches of the government. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 Fed. 45, 48-49 (C.C.A. 8th 1922). Perhaps the most cogent argument against
preliminary review on all points is that the purpose of creating an administrative board to
handle these cases is partly to relieve the courts of the burden of passing on all the details in
the administration of a complex act.
37 On the ground that there is a presumption of reasonableness accompanying the acts of
an administrative board, the courts have refused to interfere until the party has exhausted
all remedies afforded by argument and evidence before the commission up to the time the
commission issues a final order. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 Fed. 45, 48 (C.C.A. 8th 1922); E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 63 F. (2d) 362 (App. D.C. x933). This right of review satisfies due process. Arkansas
Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F. (2d) 866 (C.C.A. 8th 1927),
cerl. denied, 275 U.S. 533 (1927).
38 That is, if the Board's intervention is reasonable, there must already exist a likelihood
of disturbance; and the Board cannot then be said to be causing strife by its intervention.
Consequently if the presumption of reasonableness is followed, no court will have proper
ground for granting extraordinary, injunctive relief to an employer; for there will not be the
requisite "great and irreparable injury."
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in regard to hire or tenure of employment, operating for or against a labor
organization. This in effect makes illegal a contract not to join a union while
in the employer's service; whereas acts making "yellow dog" contracts illegal
have previously been held unconstitutional.9 These cases, however, were distinguished by the Supreme Court in the Railway Clerks case 40 in a manner
which implies that this prohibition would be held valid. While the only point
expressly decided was that section 2(3) of the Railway Labor Act4' was valid,
the Court held that a carrier had no constitutional right to interfere with the
free selection of representatives. The section in question prohibited "interference, coercion, or influence" by either party with the selection of representatives
by the other. The Court defined "influence" as the use of authority or power
of either party to induce action by the other in derogation of what the statute
called "self-organization." Since the act in question did not interfere with the
normal right of the employer to select and discharge his employees, no constitutional objection was found available. The legality of collective action could not
be disputed (Congress could make appropriate arrangements to facilitate settlement of disputes); consequently the arrangement made to promote collective
bargaining was proper. And such collective action, it was said, would be a
mockery if representation were made futile by interferences with freedom of
choice. It is no far step from this to the holding that the imposition of an
obligation not to associate with a union, as a pre-condition to employment,
would do as much to interfere with the free representation of employees as would
the imposition of that obligation after employment has commenced. And just
as the right to discharge was limited, so might the right to fix certain terms of
the hiring contract be limited in order to protect the right to organize. Consequently if the present act is construed to prohibit "yellow dog" contracts only
insofar as they tend to influence the selection of representatives, it may be held
constitutional even though incidentally, for practical purposes, this might ban
all "yellow dog" contracts. To make a "yellow dog" contract illegal per se may
be to interfere with an employer's constitutional rights; but it can fairly be said
that to make a "yellow dog" contract illegal when used as a means of influencing
the free choice of representatives is merely to protect a corresponding constitutional right of the employees. That is what the Supreme Court held with respect
to general "interference, coercion, or influence." To hold the same with respect
to a specific mode of influence would scarcely be an extension of the rule laid
down in the Railway Clerks case and would be in accord with the shift in the
attitude of the Supreme Court concerning the need to protect the right to
organize.
II. While it could not be said that the Supreme Court would be unreasonable
in holding the act unconstitutional in toto, since it has not yet expressly ap39 Adair

v. United States, 208 U.S. i6i (i9o8); Coppage v. Kansas,

236

4 Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570-I (1930).
4 48

Stat. ii86 (1934); 45 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (1935).

U.S.i (19x5).
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proved all the provisions of the Railway Labor Act42 which are analogous to
those of the Labor Relations Act, nevertheless the decisions of lower courts
amplifying what they consider the import of the Railway Clerks case lend some
weight to the notion that the present act is constitutional in form, but applicable
only to the instrumentalities of interstate transportation and communication
and not to producers.43 This is the view taken by the circuit court of appeals in
most circuits,44 especially since the Supreme Court's decision in the Carter

case. 5 But even before the decision in the Carter case, the district court in
the Bendix case held that, the plaintiff's business being primarily production
and the shipment of its product being separate from the manufacturing operations, the business was not subject to regulation under the commerce clause.
There is good constitutional authority for the proposition that a manufacturing
business is not subject to regulation under the commerce clause.46 However,
4' The decision in the Railway Clerks case passed expressly upon § 2(3) of the Railway
Labor Act, which merelyprohibits interference by one party with the free designation of representatives by the other.
43Ass'n of Rock Island Mech. & Power Plt. Employees v. Lowden, i F.Supp. 176 (Kan
1936); Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 4o, 84 F.(2d) 641 (C.C.A. 4 th June
18, 1936), cert. granted, C.C.H. Labor Law Serv. i6,ooo (1936). In the Virginian Ry. case,
it should be noted that the employees involved were "back shop" employees whose connection
with the actual running of the road was quite remote, and who were much more like production
than railway employees.
44 National Labor Relations Board v. Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., 4 U.S. L.W. 134
(C.C.A. 4th 1936) (cease and desist order enforced against interstate coach line); National
Labor Relations Board v. Associated Press, 8s F. (2d) 56 (C.C.A. 2dJuly 13, 1936), cert. granted
Oct. 36, 1936, (cease and desist order enforced against newsgathering agency for discriminatory discharge of "re-write" man); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 83 F. (2d) 998 (C.C.A. 5th June x5, 1936); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 85 F. (2d) 391 (C.C.A. 6th June 30, 1936.) Injunction to restrain hearing has
been held proper on review where the appellate court decided the Act was inapplicable to
plaintiff. Pratt v. Stout, 85 F. (2d) 172 (C.C.A. 8th Aug. 5, 1936). Other courts, however,
have declined to decide the question of applicability and denied injunctive relief. Bradley
Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2d) 97 (C.C.A. 5th June 5, 1936),
cert. denied Oct. 12, 1936; E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12 (C.C.A.
2d July 13, 1936); Precision Castings Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) is (C.C.A. 2d July 13, 1936);
Alexander Smith Carpet Co. v. Herrick, 85 F. (2d) i6 (C.C.A. 2d July 13, 1936).
4S Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), decided May 18, 1936. The labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 49 Stat. iool (ig34); 15 U.S.C.A. § 8o8
(1935), held unconstitutional as not proper regulation under the commerce clause. The act in
§§ r, 2 declares a policy of regulation under the "general welfare" and the commerce clause,
respectively. (§§ 8oi, 802). With respect to commerce, it is declared that practices prevailing
in the coal industry directly affect commerce, and that labor disputes directly obstruct commerce. The Court finds this effect indirect under the rule announced in Schechter v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (I935).
46 Manufacturing is not commerce. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918);
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 (1923). The business of a manufacturer is
not in the "stream of commerce" and does not "affect" commerce. Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (19o5); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Schechter v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (i936).
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this act does not seek to regulate any business as such; it seeks to regulate and
control the causes of labor troubles47 occurring in what is incidentally a manufacturing or mining or other enterprise. What distinguishes this act from previous acts48 held unconstitutional is that it is limited in terms to apply only to
labor disputes which are specifically found in each case to involve actual or
probable interference with interstate commerce. This also distinguishes the
act from acts regulating wages and hours and handling other labor "problems"
whose effect upon commerce has been held to be remote. 49 Itis this distinguishing feature of the act which opens the third possibility-a holding that the act
may be applied to the labor relations of producers whose product is important
in interstate commerce.
III. There is well-established authority permitting federal intervention in
labor disputes in manufacturing and mining enterprises in particular cases in
which such disputes involve actual or probable interference with interstate
commerce. The cases on this points" have already had much discussion; yet the
very fact that the cases are commonplace has led some commentators to overlook the actual holdings and accept without criticism the interpretations of
47 This and similar acts have been directed toward one point: promoting collective bargaining between representatives of parties involved in labor disputes, by providing for free selection
of representatives without coercion or influence. This does not essentially involve control of a
"business"; for, as the Supreme Court noted in Adair v. United States, 2o8 U.S. i61, 178-9
(i9o8), membership or non-membership in a labor organization has no bearing upon the fitness
of a laborer. Of course, it must be noted that the point was there being used to hold that Congress had no warrant to suppose that any relation to a labor organization could have in itself
any bearing upon the commerce with which the employee is connected by his services, so as to
make it a proper commerce regulation to declare criminal an attempt to prevent employees
from joining labor unions. However, the point should also apply to the present discussion, in
that a regulation which guarantees merely the right to belong to an organization cannot be
an interference in the business of an employer insofar forth.
48 Thus in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, the labor board thereby created had
jurisdiction of disputes over selection of representatives for collective bargaining, without
finding as a fact in each case that commerce was being or was about to be affected. 49 Stat.
ioo (i935), I5 U.S.C.A. § 8o8(e) (i935). But while labor troubles generally may not affect
commerce, the courts have already spelled out the types of circumstances under which labor
troubles can be held to affect commerce directly and unreasonably; and so long as the board
under the National Labor Relations Act finds facts bringing individual cases under these
decisions (see note So infra.), the rule of the Schechter and Carter cases would seem inapposite.
49 Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45 (igo5); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. z61 (igo8);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 56
Sup.Ct. 918 (0936). Cf. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (i917); Texas &N.O.R.R. Co. v. Railway
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930).
so United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. 994
(C.C.La. 1893); Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8 U.S. 274 (igo8); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1914);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1926); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344 (1922); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). The
literally hundreds of other cases depending upon these are partially collected in Frankfurter
and Greene, The Labor Injunction.(193o), and bibliography there compiled.
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other commentators. Consequently, in view of the fact that the strict limitation
of the act as noted above would materially reduce its importance, and in view
of the fact that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the labor injunction
cases in the Carter opinionS, may bear reconsideration, a few comments
on these cases might not be out of place. In the Carter case, the court
distinguishes the labor injunction cases on the ground that in them interstate
commerce was the direct object of attack, citing the second Coronado case:
"The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in commerce by
the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture is ordinarily an indirect
and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain
or control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price
of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust
Act."5 2 The Court next states that in the Bedford case 3 interstate commerce
was the direct object of attack; and the restraint of such commerce was the
necessary consequence of the acts and the immediate end in view. This alleged
"intent" to restrain commerce is directly contrary to the findings of fact in the
Bedford case.5 4 This was recognized by Mr. Justice Stone in his opinion in that
case,ss in which he stated that clear authority56 seemed to hold a labor union's
peaceably refusing to work on non-union materials, even though commerce was
affected, would not allow federal intervention; but that the Supreme Court in
the Duplex cases7 had rejected these views. In the Bedford case, the "intent"
to meddle with commerce itself was constructed out of the curtailment of supply
resulting from the peaceable attack on a producer. The resulting doctrine of
the labor injunction cases, then, 5 is that the mere reduction of the supply of an
51See 298 U.S. 238, 304-5 (1936).
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925).

52

s3 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1926).
S4 In Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stonecutters, 9 F.(2d) 40,41 (C.C.A. 7th (1925)), the Circuit
Court of Appeals said: "It is contended for appellants that the holding of the Supreme Court
in the second Coronado case, 268 U.S. 295 , ..
, requires the conclusion here that this asserted
conspiracy is in restraint of interstate commerce. In that case the court found there was new
evidence appearing on the second trial tending to show that one of the very purposes of the
extensive destruction of mines and other property, and of killing and injuring persons, was
to prevent the large capacity of the mines destroyed, and other mines there, from entering into
competition with the product of the union operated mines in the neighboring states. No evidence of any such purpose or conduct here appears nor of any purpose to restrain commerce."
The Supreme Court did not disturb the findings of fact of the lower courts.
ss 274 U.S. 37, 55 (1926).
s6 The Clayton Act (presumably § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914); i5 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1927), pur-

porting to eliminate combinations of labor from the operation of the Anti-Trust Act); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (i9ii); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
IO6, 178-80 (19II).
S7 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921).
s8 The Duplex and Bedford cases have been widely followed. See Frankfurter and Greene,
The Labor Injunction

173-75

(1930).
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article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention
of its manufacture is not a "direct" obstruction to commerce unless the supply
is reduced with the actual intent of controlling the supply entering commerce
or the price of it in interstate markets; but that such actual intent to restrain
commerce is implied by the fact that the actual result of the attack on the producer
is (i) to reduce the amount of his interstate trade and (2) to affect the supply or the
price of the product in interstatemarkets. This amounts to holding that the fact
plus intent is required to bring the acts done within the federal power over commerce; but that the requiredintent may be inferredfrom the fact. Couple this with
the rule that the Anti-Trust Act directs itself against the dangerous probability
of interference with interstate commerce as well as the completed result, 9 and
the conclusion seems inescapable that actual or probable labor disputes in
plants whose output appreciably 6" affects the interstate market for such products-whether because the output is large or because the product is unique, so
that the given producer is responsible for a significant part of the market supply
which exists-that such disputes under the doctrine of the later injunction cases
are within the scope of the federal power over commerce. 6' But what force will
now be given to the doctrine of the labor cases after the Cartercase is highly
problematical.
We have observed that without doing violence to established legal doctrine
the Court may choose any one of three different interpretations of the constitutional status and scope of application of the National Labor Relations Act. It
should be noted, however, that even though the act should be held constitutional and widely applicable such a holding would not necessarily give labor
organizers the carte blanche which has been anticipated by some observers. The
passage of the Clayton Act, sections 6 and 20-22, was similarly hailed by labor
as a Magna Charta and viewed by others with alarm. In this case again it may
well turn out that the policies developed under the interpretations of the act
s9 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1902); Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, x85 U.S. 65, 82 (1902).
6o It may be objected that it is hard to draw the line, but the injunction cases have already
pretty well carried out the process of defining what is an appreciable effect on commerce.
6, In the Carter case, 298 U.S. 238, 308, the Court says, "If the production by one man of a
single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment, and actually sold and shipped,

affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by multiplying the
tonnage .....

"

However, the regulation of labor disputes has not depended directly upon

whether or not the material shipped affects commerce; it depends upon whether or not a court,
following the doctrine developed in the Duplex and Bedford cases, can take the actual situation
and out of it construct an "intent" to restrain commerce. An attack by a union against the
interstate shipment of a ton of coal would scarcely be allowed to evidence an "intent" to
restrain commerce; but a boycott directed at a producer, the effect of which was to reduce
very greatly the large amounts of stone the producer was ordinarily able to ship and market
successfully in interstate markets, was in fact enough to satisfy the Court that the "intent"
was to hurt interstate commerce itself. Increase the tonnage, and the ease with which a

fictitious "intent" is constructed is also increased.
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will not be so disturbing to the status quo as a reading of the preamble may
lead one to believe. The same ground upon which this act may be held applicable in the broad sense might well support later legislation-given an appropriate
change in the policy of the government-tending to control still further the
burden of strikes and boycotts on interstate commerce by materially limiting
the right to strike. (It is true that the prohibition of "compulsory arbitration"
legislation might still prove a partial obstacle to complete supervision of labor
relations and control of strikes.) It is not suggested that this act contains a
hidden menace to organized labor; it is merely suggested that such an act as
this need not inspire undue dread in the general public or in employers, nor
undue hope in the leaders of labor.
PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES IN MARRIAGE LAW
The difficulties surrounding an attempt to alter statute law are notorious.
Once a revision is accepted it may be impossible to procure further revision
for years. Consequently a new statute should be drafted with extreme care. In
failing to suggest any substantial departures from the existing law the draftsmen
of the proposed Illinois Marital Relations Bill, have failed to recognize that extreme care requires not merely rejection of changes whose value has not been
demonstrated but also insistence upon changes where the existing law has
proved itself inadequate.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that a more extensive study of
the problems in the law of Marital Relations should be made before the Bill is
considered by the Legislature. It will be sufficient to examine only the more
striking inadequacies in the sections on Marriage.2 This is, of course, not intended to imply that the other sections are error-free. The whole Bill must be
explored for desirable changes in policy and form alike. But no criticism of
public policy is here attempted; suggestions are made only where results generally considered desirable are missed or the language is so ambiguous that the
law remains uncertain.
Like all American marriage statutes, 3 the Bill sets up an intermediate age
class in which parental consent is required for a marriage.4 Although the Ian' Illinois House of Representatives Bill No. 919. In the Marriage and Divorce articles there
are no material changes from Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, cc. 89 and 4o, respectively.
2 Other parts are: Divorce; Uniform Marriage Evasion Law; Rights of Husband and Wife;
Relinquishment of Dower and Homestead of Insane Spouse; Power over Property upon
Absence or Imprisonment of Spouse; Relief to Destitute Wife or Children; Separate Maintenance.
31 Vernier, American Family Laws 188 (I93I).
4 "Sec. 3. Age. Male persons of the age of 21 years and older and female persons of the age
of 18 years and older may be joined in marriage. A male person who is a minor not less than 18
years old or a female person who is a minor not less than x6 years old may contract a legal
marriage if the parent or guardian of the minor appears before the county clerk in the county
where the minor resides, consents to the marriage, makes an affidavit stating that he is the

